Abstracts Capital Budgeting and Idiosyncratic Risk Using an NPV-based revealed-preference strategy, I find that idiosyncratic risk materially affects the discount rate that firms use in their capital budgeting decisions. I exploit quasiexogenous within-region variation in project-specific idiosyncratic risk and find that, on average, firms inflate their discount rate by 5 percentage points (pp) in response to an 18 pp increase in idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, these discount rate adjustments are negatively associated with various measures of firm profitability. I then explore how proxies for costly external financing and agency frictions relate to discount rate adjustments. I find that firms appear to adjust their discount rate upward as a form of risk management when facing costly external financing frictions. Also, I provide evidence that firms partially insure managers against project-specific underperformance to mitigate discount rate adjustments due to agency frictions.
Real Option Exercise: Empirical Evidence with Erik P. Gilje, and Jérôme P. Taillard
We study when and why firms exercise real options. Using detailed project-level investment data, we find that the likelihood that a firm exercises a real option is strongly related to peer exercise behavior. Peer exercise decisions are as important in explaining exercise behavior as variables commonly associated with standard real option theories, such as volatility. We identify peer effects using localized exogenous variation in peer project exercise decisions and find evidence consistent with information externalities being important for exercise behavior.
